

# Security Engineering for Machine Learning



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where I'm coming from



berryville institute of machine learning



intro to ML and ML  
Security






# computer programs are usually about HOW



- Programs specify how a task should be completed
- Example
  - Look for three intersecting line segments





# machine learning is about WHAT



- Specify what should be done
- (and hope the model solves the problem in a reasonable fashion)

- Example


- Here are several triangles




# on AI, ML, and other gobbledygook





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


# on AI, ML, and other gobbledygook





# a generic ML model



- Nine basic components
  - Processes are ovals
  - Collections are rectangles
- Arrows represent information flow
- We used this model to think about risks in each component



## nomenclature matters

- “Adversarial Machine Learning” implies intention on the part of an attacker doing the hard stuff
- Sometimes security risks don’t require an attacker to carry risk
- Insecure systems invite attacks
- That’s why we call this field “Machine Learning Security”



an aside on ML  
attacks




# a super simple attack taxonomy

MANIPULATION	EXTRACTION
Data manipulation Poisoning or "causative" attack Ex: publish bogus data	Data extraction "inference attacks" or "model inversion" Ex: extract details of training corpus
Input manipulation Adversarial examples Ex: concoct input to break model	Input extraction "model inversion" Ex: recover inputs from outputs
Model manipulation "backdooring" or "supply chain" Ex: Trojan an open source model	Model extraction "open the box" Ex: copy behavior or parameters



## on attacks versus risks

- We need to do better work to secure our ML systems, moving well beyond attack of the day and penetrate and patch towards real security engineering.
- BIML's work (and indeed all of security) is just as much about creating resilient and reliable ML systems as it is about security. In our view, security is an emergent property of a system. **No system that is unreliable and fragile can be secure.**



# ML risk analysis






## the BIML-78

- BIML has identified 78 risks tied to 10 components in a generic ML model
- We have also mapped known attacks and attack surfaces to our model
- <https://berryvilleiml.com/results/ara.pdf>




# 1: raw data in the world (13 risks)



- Data play a critical role in ML systems, in fact data are the **MOST IMPORTANT** aspect of ML security
- Lots of raw data out there to be manipulated
- Examples:
  - [raw:1:data confidentiality]
  - [raw:2:trustworthiness]




## 2: dataset assembly (8 risks)



- Raw data must be transformed into ML format
- Pre-processing is critical to security
- Online versus offline models (offline is easier to secure)
- Examples:
  - [assembly:1:encoding integrity]
  - **[assembly:2:annotation]**




## 3: datasets (7 risks)



- Data are grouped into training, validation, and test sets
- Such partitioning is a tricky process that deeply impacts future ML behavior
- Examples:
  - **[data:1:poisoning]**
  - [data:2:transfer]




## 4: learning algorithm (11 risks)



- The technical heart of ML (but less security risk than the data)
- Online versus offline (offline is easier to secure)
- Examples:
  - [alg:1:online]
  - [alg:2:reproducibility]



## 5: evaluation (7 risks)




- When is training “done”?
- How good is the trained model?
- Examples:
  - [eval:1:overfitting]
  - [eval:2:bad eval data]






## 6: inputs (5 risks)



- What input is fed to the trained model during production?
- Very similar to dataset assembly risks and raw data risks
- Examples:
  - [input:1:adversarial examples]
  - [input:2:controlled input stream]




## 7: model (5 risks)



- Risks associated with a fielded model
- Similar to evaluation risks in many respects
- Examples:
  - [model:1:improper re-use]
  - **[model:2:Trojan]**




## 8: inference algorithm (5 risks)



- More risks associated with a fielded model
- Output risks arise
- Examples:
  - [inference:1:online]
  - **[inference:2:inscrutability]**



## 9: outputs (7 risks)



- System output is often the whole point
- Direct attack on the output is pretty obvious
- Examples:
  - **[output:1:direct]**
  - [output:2:provenance]



## system-wide risks (10 risks)



- Getting beyond (and over) a component view
- These risks happen between or across components
- Examples:
  - [system:1:black box discrimination]
  - [system:2:overconfidence]




top five ML risks





# 1. adversarial examples

- Probably the most commonly discussed attacks
- Fool an ML system by providing malicious input often involving very small perturbations that cause the system to make a false prediction or categorization
- Though coverage and resulting attention might be disproportionately large, swamping out other important ML risks, adversarial examples are very much real



## 2. data poisoning

- Data play an outsized role in the security of an ML system
- If an attacker can intentionally manipulate the data being used by an ML system in a coordinated fashion, the entire system can be compromised
- Data poisoning attacks require special attention.
  - What fraction of the training data can an attacker control and to what extent?




### 3. online system manipulation

- An ML system is said to be “online” when it continues to learn during operational use, modifying its behavior over time
- A clever attacker can nudge the still-learning system in the wrong direction on purpose
- This slowly “retrains” the ML system to do the wrong thing
- This risk is complex, demanding that ML engineers consider data provenance, algorithm choice, *and* system operations in order to properly address it



## 4. transfer learning attack

- In many cases in the real world, ML systems are constructed by taking advantage of an already-trained base model which is then fine-tuned to carry out a more specific task
- A data transfer attack takes place when the base system is compromised (or otherwise unsuitable), making unanticipated behavior defined by the attacker possible



## 5. data confidentiality



- Data protection is difficult enough without throwing ML into the mix
- One unique challenge in ML is protecting sensitive or confidential data that, through training, are built right into a model
- Subtle but effective extraction attacks against an ML system's data are an important category of risk





where to learn  
more



# build security in

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